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Abstract
This paper argues that welfare state progress needs to be
based upon support for “inclusive citizenship” – the right to
care, work and earn. Comparative analyses of welfare have
often focused on defamilization to capture these dimen-
sions. But inclusive citizenship requires challenging gender
roles in both work (public sphere) and care (private sphere),
and thus the paper argues that the concept of
degenderization is a more suitable analytical tool. This paper
adds to our understanding by operationalizing the concept
of degenderization to compare how (far) 22 European coun-
tries degenderize. Indeed, it goes further to examine not just
how much welfare states degenderize but how – whether
they focus on degendering both work and care, crucial for
“inclusive citizenship”. To examine how states degenderize, it
uses a new way of classifying welfare states by examining
policy packages using radar charts. It examines how much
they degenderize against a yardstick, using the Surface Mea-
sure of Overall Performance approach. Seven welfare types
were identified, but none fully supported inclusive citizen-
ship. Indeed, the country clusters identified in this study dif-
fer from those found by previous studies, challenging
commonly held views about which countries ought to be
seen as key exemplars. This reflects the paper's distinctive
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focus on inclusive citizenship – capturing support for
degendering care and work – and that it compares countries
on the basis of their policy packages. It also examines how
approach to and generosity of degenderization are related to
gender equality outcomes.
K E YWORD S
comparative, defamilization, degenderization, family policy, radar
charts, SMOP approach
1 | INTRODUCTION
Feminist analysts of the welfare state have sought to understand how far social policies sustain the male breadwinner/
female housewife carer model of the family. Defamilization has been the common analytical tool used to examine this.
Lister (1994) coined the term defamilization as “the degree to which individuals can uphold a socially acceptable stan-
dard of living independently of family relationships” (Lister, 1994, p. 37). Esping-Andersen defined it slightly differently
as “the degree in which households” welfare and care responsibilities are relaxed’ (Esping Andersen, 1999, p. 51).
Whilst defamilization can be more comprehensively and multi-dimensionally understood (Zagel & Lohmann, 2020),
much of the research to date on welfare regime analysis has adopted a narrow definition that focused on the care
responsibilities of the family. This culminates from the feminist critiques of Esping Andersen's (1990) ‘Three Worlds of
Welfare’ that highlighted how he ignored gender and gender role norms within the breadwinner/female care model of
the family and ultimately the differential impact that these have on the welfare for women and men. The research that
has developed from this body of work has adopted a defamilization perspective focusing on the role of the state in
unburdening women from their care responsibilities within the family so they can be active in the labour market, that is,
in commodifying women (Korowska, 2018). The policy solutions linked to this have generally focused on removing care
from the family rather than directly challenging the gender division of unpaid care work in the private sphere. However,
to enable mothers to access paid work, we need to more directly tackle gender roles within the family, encourage men
to care, value care in its own right and thus incorporate care, as well as work, into “inclusive citizenship” – the right to
care, work and earn (Kremer, 2007). To support “inclusive citizenship”, policy needs to actively challenge the existing
gender role norms in unpaid as well as paid work – to degenderize – otherwise the status quo is likely to continue with
men and women not equally achieving access to paid work and care. Saxonberg (2013) argued that the concept of
degenderization would more directly measure how well welfare state policies, such as parental leave, tackle gender
role norms within the family. This paper adds to our understanding by aiming to operationalize the concept of
degenderization to compare how (far) 22 European countries degenderize – promote the elimination of gender roles
(Saxonberg (2013, p. 7) – in both the public and private sphere.
Indeed, it adds further original contribution to the debate by examining not just how much welfare states degen-
derize but how – whether they focus on degendering both work and care, crucial for “inclusive citizenship”.
2 | FROM DEFAMILIZATION TO INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP
Welfare states analysts have used citizenship as a yardstick to classify regimes into types. Inevitably, how citizenship
is defined influences how welfare states are assessed. Esping Andersen's (1990) classic welfare regime typology was
based upon the extent that welfare states decommodify labour and enable citizens to live independently from the
market. This has attracted criticism because it was based upon the mainstream definition that assumes social
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citizenship rights are attached to labour market participation but ignores how the gender division of labour within the
family has limited women's integration into paid work. Feminists responded by focusing on the extent that welfare
state regimes enable women to access paid work and employment-based welfare state provision on an equal basis as
men (e.g., Lewis, 1992; Lister, 1994; Orloff, 1993), using the analytical framework defamilization and familization.
Defamilizing policies reduce the care responsibilities of the family (mother) with states and markets filling the gap to
enable women to take up paid work (Lister, 1994; Esping Andersen, 1999. Familistic policies encourage the families
caring function and thus are assumed to support the male-breadwinner, female carer model of the family. Various
researchers have built defamilization indexes, ranking and grouping countries into welfare types according to “how
well” they defamilize (e.g., Bambra, 2004; Ferrarini, 2006; Gornick et al., 1997; Kroger, 2011; Lohmann & Zegal, 2016).
Defamilization recognizes that women undertake a disproportionate share of unpaid care work, reducing their
access to financial autonomy. Arguably, however, the concept adopts a “Cinderella approach” that assumes care is a
“burden” and a “problem” needing to be solved by extra-familial childcare “freeing” women to access paid employment
(Kremer, 2007). By doing so, it only indirectly addresses how the gender division of care in the private sphere limits
equality in the public sphere (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014; Ciccia & Verloo, 2012). Defamilization therefore does not
fully recognize how the “burden” of care continues and is potentially magnified, when women enter paid work – even
the most generous extra-familial childcare will not wholly solve the “problem” of care (Ciccia & Verloo, 2012). The
“independence” of paid work can lead to a “double shift” as mothers return from the public sphere of work to under-
take the caring role in the private sphere. The “burden” of care is thus intensified, leading to reduced work opportuni-
ties and women withdrawing or reducing labour market attachment – women are unable to be fully defamilized.
By problematizing care, the concept of defamilization overlooks the importance of care for society as a form of
welfare that everyone needs. In both the mainstream and defamilization definitions of citizenship, carers are given a
lower citizenship status than those in paid work. Care is undervalued and consequently remains gendered. To reduce
the “burden” of care, care needs to be valued as a social right in itself rather than as a condition for paid labour
(Cantillon, Ghysels, Mussche, & Van Dam, 2001; Ciccia & Verloo, 2012; Knijn & Kremer, 1997). This requires
adopting the “snow white” approach – care as a pleasure – as well as the “Cinderella” approach – care as a burden
(Kremer, 2007). If care is valued as a right in itself, it will become less feminized by giving men the right to care,
increasing men's opportunities and enabling them to be less tied to traditional “male” roles – both in the private and
public sphere. If citizenship is about participation in all aspects of life, including caring, working and earning
(Fraser, 1989), then the lack of opportunity to participate in one aspect would be a denial of full citizenship. This is
what Kremer defines as “inclusive citizenship”.
3 | WELFARE STATES AND “ INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP”
For welfare states to support “inclusive citizenship”, they need to (a) support female paid work and male care and
(b) actively challenge gender role norms. Saxonberg (2013) argues it therefore makes more “sense to talk about gen-
dering and degenderizing policies rather than familizing and defamilizing policies” which only assess one side of the
equation (pp. 7). The concept of degenderization enables welfare states to be analysed in terms of how far they chal-
lenge the gender role norms in both the public and private sphere – how far they support paid work and care as citi-
zenship rights for men and women.
A key reason to focus on degenderization rather than defamilization is that since the latter overlooks the value
of care as a social right, it tends to view highly familistic welfare states negatively, assuming they will strengthen the
caring role of women and reproduce the gendered division of labour (Leitner, 2003). However, some familistic poli-
cies such as parental leave (a) are not automatically familizing or defamilizing (Saxonberg, 2013) and (b) can challenge
gender roles by promoting men's role in care (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014). Reflecting this ambiguity, some studies
view parental leave as defamilizing (Bambra, 2004), whereas others include it as familizing. Michon (2008) identifies
positive care familization (carers are supported to care at home, so that parental caring is optional for working
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parents), as opposed to negative familization (when parents care rather than undertake paid work due to the lack of
state support to do so). However, Michon does not include male care in positive care familization, explicitly excluding
paternity leaves from the analysis. There are examples where paternity leave is deemed positive familism
(e.g., Daly & Schweiwe, 2010), but generally in the literature, men's care is treated as a means to facilitate women's
defamilization, rather than as a means to degender the care role per se.
In this sense, defamilization is limited as an analytical tool for assessing state support for “inclusive citizenship”.
The concept of degenderization overcomes this. It recognizes that familizing policies can be pivotal in enabling both
men and women to enjoy “inclusive citizenship” – the right to work and the right to care. So, defamilization and
familization can be positive, as long as they degender – actively challenge the gender division of labour – and do so
alongside each other. There is thus value in empirically assessing the extent to which welfare states support
degenderization rather than defamilization. This paper aims to do this across European nations. We turn next to the
question of how such an empirical assessment might proceed.
4 | OPERATIONALIZING DEGENDERIZATION
Saxonberg (2013) operationalizes the concept of degenderization to an extent – but “focuses on “re-theorization”
rather than empirical details of each country” (pp. 9). When empirically measuring the extent to which welfare states
seek to support degenderization, it is important to choose indicators that measure policy rather than outcomes
(J. Javornik, 2014; Saxonberg, 2013). This is because these measure two different issues – the former is state sup-
port whereas the latter is the result of these – but also of other factors such as culture – and thus does not neces-
sarily measure state support for degenderization or, at least, not directly. It is also important to choose policy
indicators that explicitly challenge gender role norms. Policies, such as leave rights, that are not in themselves gen-
dering may result in gendered outcomes given the culture of gender role norms within society. We focus on poli-
cies that challenge gender role norms during the transition to parenthood and for those caring for preschool
children. Whilst gender inequalities in care need to be challenged throughout the life course, shared care when
children are very young will likely have an impact beyond (Duvander et al., 2020; Unterhofer & Wrohlich, 2017).
We will explore how degenderization – both men's caring role and women's access to paid work – can be mea-
sured and outline the six indicators that comprise the degenderization policy index used in this paper. A bench-
mark of a best and worst possible score is identified for each indicator. Raw data for each indicator can be found
in Figure A1. Data are from the OECD Family Database unless otherwise indicated. The sample comprised all
European countries covered by this database, excluding those for which key indicators were unavailable. This left
22 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, German, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.
4.1 | Degendering paid work in the public sphere
When analysing how welfare states degenderize paid work, there has been a tendency for analysts to include the
proportion of pre-school children attending day care as an indicator of childcare policy. However, this is likely to be
measuring policy outcomes rather than policy inputs, because “day care” includes both public and private sector care
and because wider influences other than policy such as cultural norms and socio-economic factors (including ability
to pay) will impact take-up (J. Javornik, 2014). So, attendance may differ between countries with the same amount
of public support for day care, and it is not therefore a reliable measure of welfare state support for degenderization
(Saxonberg, 2013).
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The state can influence the availability of childcare through childcare guarantees. Whilst this reflects a right to
receive (institutional) care financially organized by the state, this right to receive care guarantees that citizens can
participate in employment and earn income. It challenges the gender roles norms by enabling the main carer, nor-
mally women, the right not to care in order to take up their right to employment (Kremer, 2007). A fulltime childcare
guarantee (for pre-schoolers) is best for enabling mothers to take up paid work. A guarantee only for older pre-
schoolers or for a few hours a week is an indication childcare is provided more for educational or social needs of chil-
dren rather than maternal employment. In this paper, we use two measures multiplied together to create an indicator
of a full childcare guarantee. The first measures the age when a pre-school childcare guarantee begins in 2012/13
(source, Eurydice, 2014).1 In the index, welfare states were scored according to the age from which they guarantee
childcare – under the age of 1 scoring 5, from age 1–2 scoring 4, age 2–3, scoring 3, age 3–4 scoring 2 and from age
4 to compulsory school age scoring 1. The final group scored 0 because either they did not guarantee childcare or
were selective. The second indicator is the number of hours per week childcare is guaranteed, which was capped at
40 hours a week; Eurydice does not capture guarantees beyond 40 hr. The most degenderizing score is therefore
200 (5 (guarantee from under age 1) × 40 hours), the least was 0.2
Take up of paid work is influenced by the costs of childcare and the financial benefits of entering paid work for
second earners (usually mothers). High childcare costs impact heavily upon the financial incentives for mothers (with
pre-school children) to enter paid work, and they can negate earnings gained by a second earner (Esping
Andersen, 2002), but welfare states can step in to mitigate the effects of childcare costs. Welfare states can also
ensure work pays via careful design of tax and benefit systems and through mitigating the loss of out of work and
income tested benefits. To measure the financial incentive for mothers to enter work, we use the childcare participa-
tion tax rate (CPTR) calculated by OECD for a second earner moving from labour market inactivity into full-time
employment with 67% average earnings using a scenario where their two children are aged 2 and 3 and their spouse
has earnings equal to 100% of average earnings in 2015. The CPTR is the proportion of prospective gross earnings
that would be “taxed” away and also includes the influence of childcare fees alongside tax burdens and benefit with-
drawals.3 If the CPTR is high, a large proportion of the second earner's gross earnings will be taxed way/lost to
childcare fees, creating a financial disincentive to take up paid work. A CPTR of 100% would mean second earners
would keep none of their earnings. In our sample, the CPTR of 102% in the UK was taken as the benchmark for the
least degendering score partly because it was the worst in the sample and partly because a CPTR above 100% would
mean that the second earner enters paid work at their own expense. The most degendering score is 0 as this would
mean the second earner keeps all their earnings and thus a high financial incentive to move into paid employment.
Maternity leave protects women's right to paid work after taking a break for caring rights when they have (more)
children (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). A gender leave gap indicator discussed in the next section recognizes that mater-
nity leave can however serve to genderize if the leave is lengthy, and whilst the length at which leave shifts from a
benefit to a detriment is debateable, there are documented negative effects of lengthy leaves on maternal employ-
ment and the gender pay gap (see e.g., Ruhm, 1998). At the same time, low or unpaid leaves are unlikely to grant full
citizenship either as citizens will have to negotiate paid work and care at their own expense (Kremer, 2007). Thus,
the non-transferable maternity leave average wage replacement rate in 2016 is included in the index to reflect this.
This indicator captures the proportion of previous earnings replaced by maternity leave benefit over the duration of
the paid leave entitlement for a person earning 100% of average national earnings. It ranges from 0, when the mater-
nity leave is unpaid to 100% when the mother is paid the equivalent of her full wage whilst on leave.
4.2 | Degenderizing care in the private sphere
Familistic policies can be degendering if they (a) actively challenge the gender role norms and (b) enable the right to
care and earn an income. Familisitic policies, such as transferable gender neutral leaves, that allow the family to orga-
nize work and care will likely lead to gendered outcomes; evidence suggesting they do not increase fathers'
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participation in care work since it is usually the mother who takes the leave (Bergman & Hobson, 2002; Bruning &
Plantenga, 1999). On the other hand, non-transferable leave can challenge existing norms by allocating separate
leave rights to fathers or by allocating equal individual rights to mothers and fathers.4 To capture this, we compute a
gender leave gap, which compares all employment protected paid leave available to mothers (including home
childcare leaves), and all non-transferable paid leave for fathers in order to compare whether states support paternal
and maternal care on an equal basis. Both duration of leave and average wage replacement rate have been
accounted for to assess generosity. It is assumed that women will take up transferable or shared leave, even if the
replacement rate is relatively high. Thus, only leave that is specifically allocated to the father, and will be lost if he
does not take it, is included in the index as this is more likely to encourage take up by fathers. The gender leave gap
captures how equal leaves are in lengths and replacement rates. It is calculated as follows: weeks of paid leave
reserved for father*average wage replacement rate/weeks of paid leave available to mothers*average wage replace-
ment rate. The highest score is 1, when the mother and father are entitled to an equal combination of payment and
leave length. The lowest is 0 when no paid paternity leave exists. Theoretically, if paternity leave was more generous
than maternity, then the highest score would rise above 1, but this is not the case for any of the countries in our
sample.
Given gendered assumptions about masculine roles, it is also unlikely gendered outcomes will be challenged
without high wage replacement and flexibility of leave since these are well-documented ways in which states can
encourage increased fathers' take-up of leave (Bruning & Plantenga, 1999; Wilkinson, Radley, Christie, Lawson, &
Sainsbury, 1997). Economists argue that it is more economically rational for women rather than men to take parental
leave, given gender pay gaps (Björnberg, 2002). If the benefit is paid at less than full earnings, the absolute income
lost will increase with higher (usually male) earnings. Thus, a high-wage replacement rate will serve to encourage,
and enable, fathers to take leave up. We therefore include the average replacement rate for all non-transferable
leave for fathers – not just immediately post birth (2016). The highest rate is 100% of earnings replaced. The lowest
is 0 if transferable paternity leave either does not exist or is unpaid.
Research indicates that even when the economic costs of fathers taking leave are negligible, take up is still low.
It may be that fathers will be less willing than mothers to take a complete break from the labour market to undertake
full-time care since paid work is deeply engendered (Björnberg, 2002). Thus it is important that leave is flexible
(e.g. that working hours can be reduced) in order to enable fathers to access their right to care alongside their right
to paid work. We therefore compare flexibility of paid individual non-transferable paternity leave (Source: Interna-
tional Network on Leave Policies and Research, 2016) based on whether there are options for leave to be taken
(a) on a part-time basis (b) in one or several blocks, (c) for a shorter period with a higher benefit or longer with lower
benefit and (d) at any time until a child reaches a certain age. A score of 1 is given for each of these, a range of 4 if all
exist through to 0 if no (paid) paternity leave exists or if the leave is not flexible.
Table 1 summarizes the indicators for policies that support degenderizing of paid work in the public sphere and
degendering care in the private sphere.
5 | TYPOLOGIZING WELFARE STATES ACCORDING TO
DEGENDERIZATION
Inclusive citizenship requires welfare states to support degendering in both the public and private sphere and to be
generous in their approach. We need to understand not just how much (if at all) overall support for “inclusive citizen-
ship” is provided by welfare sates but also, if they do degender at all, how they support “inclusive citizenship” – do
they support both women's access to paid work and men's access to care? Supporting both sets of policies evenly
and generously encourages inclusive citizenship.
To visualize how countries support inclusive citizenship, radar charts will be used to illustrate degendering poli-
cies. This approach enables performance to be compared on multiple dimensions and can illustrate the areas where
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welfare states are placing more focus relative to others. Welfare states with similar-shaped polygons on the radar
chart will be emphasizing similar policies and be similar in their approach to degenderization. We can thus typologize
welfare states according to this visualization – how they approach degendering policies and whether they degender-
ize in all areas to support inclusive citizenship. While such an approach allows us to usefully group countries based
on visual similarity of actual policy differences rather than mere arithmetic similarity, it might be objected that visual
inspection may miss similarities that would be found in arithmetic taxonomy techniques such as cluster analysis.
Consequently, sensitivity analysis was carried out using cluster analysis to classify countries in relation to how they
approach degendering policies. A hierarchical cluster analysis was undertaken using the Ward method and Squared
Euclidean Distance as the measure. This sensitivity analysis confirmed the radar approach to be robust (Table B1,
Figure B1), albeit with some differences in the clustering of countries between the two approaches. These are
explained and justified below.
To fully support inclusive citizenship, welfare states need to be generous. Two countries might have similar
approaches, but one might be more generous and thus more degendering. In other words, we need to understand
not just how (approach) but how much (generosity). We can see how well a country is doing in each indicator in the
index as they are standardized so that the highest score — the best performance — is 1 and the lowest score – the
worst performance – is 0 meaning a country does not degenderize at all on that indicator. Each country's overall sup-
port for degenderization, and in each sphere, can be assessed using the SMOP approach (Surface Measure of Overall
Performance). This calculates the total surface area of the radar diagram. The better a country is performing, the
larger the total surface area covered. If a country does not degenderize on any measures, the SMOP score will be
0. The actual values for each indicator are used to define the area using the following formula for calculating the area
of a polygon:
SMOP= ð I1*I2ð Þ+ I2*I3ð Þ+ I3*I4ð Þ+ I4*I5ð Þ+…+ In*I1ð Þ*SIN 360=nð Þ*PI=180ð Þð Þ=
2 I = the indicator score andn= the number of sidesð Þ:
The score can then be presented as a proportion of the best possible score – that is, the area of the polygon if a
country scored the best score possible on each indicator. The closer a country's actual values are to the ideal, the
closer their overall score will be to 1 and the better the country is doing in relation to degenderization. Previously,
radar charts have been used illustrate how parental leaves and childcare support differ cross-nationally but only in
eight post socialist states (J. Javornik, 2014) and eight Northern European states (K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017) and
without benchmarking the performance of countries using the SMOP score. In this paper, the SMOP proportion is
used to compare the performance of countries in relation degenderization policies, comparing welfare states against
a benchmark of an “ideal” welfare state which fully degenderizes both work and care.
Worth noting is that in SMOP analyses, the calculated surface area differs according to the order in which the
indicators are placed. It is possible to account for this with a low number of indicators by finding the average of the
combinations of orders, although this is more difficult to do for larger numbers, and in any case, Mosley and
Mayer (1999) demonstrated the difference between the various combinations is minimal. Nonetheless, a number of
measures were taken to account for this potential issue. With six indicators, there are 720 possible combinations;
TABLE 1 Summary of degendering policy indicators
Policies degendering in the public sphere Policies degendering in the private sphere
• Number of hours per week childcare is guaranteed
• Age when a pre-school childcare guarantee begins
• Childcare participation tax rate (CPTR)
• Non-transferable maternity leave average wage
replacement rate
• Gender leave gap
• Replacement rate for individual paternity leave
• Flexibility of paid individual non-transferable
paternity leave
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computation of all possible iterations of the SMOP score was prohibitive, so a random sample of 10% (the 1st and
then the 11th thereafter) of these combinations was taken and the SMOP score calculated for each of them. We
then used the average of these 72 SMOP scores to compare the extent to which welfare states were degendering
rather than relying on a single iteration of the SMOP score. In addition, a simple additive index of our six indicators
was computed as a sensitivity analysis (See Appendix B: Figure B1); this confirmed the SMOP method as robust with
only two slight differences in the ordering of the countries, detailed below.
6 | HOW WELFARE STATES DEGENDERIZE?
We will now examine inclusive citizenship by comparing how welfare states degenderize according to differing types
of approach in degendering policies in the private and public sphere. By examining patterns of degendering policy
packages, we found seven major types of welfare states with the UK forming a sub-type within the final type.
6.1 | Type I: Balanced degendering policy package: Norway, Sweden and Germany
Type I includes Norway, Sweden and Germany, which the cluster analysis also groups together (with Estonia –
Appendix B: Figure B1). Figure 1 shows they have a fairly balanced degendering policy profile, with efforts to degen-
derize both work and care. Their paternal leave has a relatively high-wage replacement rate and is flexible. Neverthe-
less, leave is still relatively genderizing due to longer maternal leaves, being 63.3 weeks longer in Sweden,
87.9 weeks in Norway and 91.3 weeks in Germany.
These welfare states take a relatively balanced approach to degenderizing paid work in all the policy areas, not
focusing on one over the other. Unlike the other two states, Germany's maternity replacement rate is higher than its
paternity – indicating that mothers more than fathers are encouraged to take a break from work to care. Type I wel-
fare states offer a full-time childcare guarantee from the age of 1, reflecting that care is considered a mother's role in
first 12 months. Financial incentives for mothers to enter paid work are fairly high, keeping around two thirds of their
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6.2 | Type II: Mixed degendering policy package: Finland, Denmark and Slovenia
Type II includes Finland, Denmark and Slovenia (see Figure 2). These cases are also grouped together in the cluster
analysis (Table B1, Figure B1). Degendering policies are mixed in these countries – limiting inclusive citizenship. A
key feature is the greater emphasis on a full childcare guarantee relative to other policies but coupled with relatively
low financial incentives to undertake paid work. The right time to care is weakly supported – the gender leave gap is
wide – and none of the countries are fully flexible or offer a full paternity wage replacement rate. In agreement with
Saxonberg (2013) and K. Javornik and Kurowska (2017), we thus find that Denmark and Finland combine
degenderizing childcare with explicitly genderizing parental leaves, a combination is more common in former commu-
nist countries (Saxonberg, 2013), which perhaps explains the pairing with Slovenia in this paper and others
(e.g., Ciccia & Verloo, 2012).
6.3 | Type III: Work focused, gendering care policy package: Estonia and Hungary
Type III includes Estonia and Hungary (Figure 3). The cluster analysis includes Estonia in Type I and Hungary with
the Type II (Table B1, Figure B1), but differences justify a separate welfare type: Ciccia's (2017) study of 30 countries
identified Estonia and Hungary as a distinct male breadwinner/caregiver parity sub-type. First, Estonia places less
emphasis on degendering care than Type I countries – non-transferable paternity leave of only 2 weeks (and 1 week
in Hungary), with limited flexibility. Both states have wide gender leave gaps, with extra-ordinarily long leaves avail-
able to mothers – 166 weeks in Estonia and 160 in Hungary – and in Hungary (as with Greece), the paternity
replacement rate is higher than the maternity. Despite Estonia and Hungary supporting some degendering of care, it
is mothers who are deemed the main carers.
In contrast to type II welfare states, Hungary offers a full-time childcare guarantee from age 3. Other studies
place Estonia close to the Nordic countries (not Iceland) in this respect since it supports maternal employment imme-
diately after leave (K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017) and thus is similar to Type I countries, with a full childcare guaran-
tee from age 1.5. Attention is also paid to supporting financial incentives for mothers to take up employment, with


















6.4 | Type IV: Care focused policy package: France, Luxembourg and Portugal
France, Portugal and Luxembourg are placed together in the radar chart approach (Figure 4) and the cluster analysis
(see Table B1, Figure B1). These states support working mothers to retain their right to care but do less to enable
them to take up the right to paid work – minimal childcare rights and limited financial incentives. Notably, type V
supports more equal care rights than other types, with relatively narrow gender leave gaps; Portugal's gap (paternity
leave at 62% of leave available to mothers) being the narrowest in the sample, Luxembourg's (40%), the second
narrowest and France (30%) the 5th narrowest gap. However, despite generous paternal time rights (22 weeks in
Portugal, 26 weeks in Luxembourg and 28 weeks in France), fathers are unlikely to take these up, given limited wage
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6.5 | Type V: Hybrids: Belgium and Iceland
Type V – Belgium and Iceland – (Figure 5) has an approach to degenderization that does not fit with other countries.
The cluster analysis places them together (Table B1, Figure B1) since both have a relatively low gender leave gap –
amongst the lowest in the sample with paternity leave at 38% of total leave available for mothers for Belgium
(behind Luxembourg) and 50% in Iceland (only Portugal has a smaller gap).
But visualizing their policy patterns highlights important differences: Belgium has a partial childcare guarantee
of 28 hr childcare from the age of 3, but Iceland lacks a childcare guarantee. Nevertheless, Saxonberg (2013)
showed Iceland had high public childcare coverage (albeit using old data), and so it may be that this welfare state
successfully plugs the childcare gap despite no guarantee. Belgium has a low paternity replacement rate, relative to
the other policy areas. So, despite an overall fairly balanced policy profile, each has reduced support in one pol-
icy area.
6.6 | Type VI: Financially supportive policy package: Austria, Netherlands, Spain,
Poland and Greece
Type VI (Figure 6) consists of welfare states that were also grouped together in the cluster analysis (with Hungary
– Table B1, Figure B1). These emphasize financial incentives to take up rights via a focus on childcare participation
rates and maternity leave replacement rates for mothers. However, little importance is placed on the role of
childcare guarantees to enable mothers to work. Likewise, more attention is placed on the paternity leave replace-
ment rate than flexibility of leave or time to care − the gender leave gap is wide – although Austria and Spain
stand out in these groups with relatively narrow gender leave gaps. Financial supports alone will not successfully
degenderize.
The Netherlands' may be mis-represented by placing it in type VI: Its weak degendering leaves could be a trade-
off for strong rights for part-time employment, designed to encourage dual-caring. This, however, is unlikely to chal-
lenge gender role norms since the decision about how to divide work and care is still left to the family in the context













F IGURE 5 Type V:
Hybrid: Belgium, Iceland
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6.7 | Type VII: Explicitly gendering: Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Ireland
Type VII (Figure 7) includes liberal and post-communist countries which do little to challenge gender norms in the
private sphere and provide minimal support in the public sphere. They have in common a non-existent paternity
leave and some of the longest maternal leaves in the sample. Any support for degenderization is focused on childcare
guarantees and maternity replacement rates, albeit with low generosity; only 35% of the average wage in Ireland,
the second lowest in the sample. Childcare guarantees are minimal (no guarantee in Slovak Republic) focusing on the
right to receive care via early education of older pre-school children rather than the right not to care by enabling
mothers to work.
6.8 | Type VIIa: Predominantly gendering: The United Kingdom
TheUnitedKingdom is placedwith Ireland in the cluster analysis (TableB1, FigureB1), but the radar approach identified some
differences that supported Ciccia (2017)'s finding that the UK is a sub-type (Figure 8). The main difference is that there is
some attempt to support the right of fathers to care, with 2 weeks' paternity leave available albeit at a low replacement rate
and low flexibility and thus limited encouragement for it to actually be taken up. Similar to type VII is limited incentives for
mothers to take up paid work, with only a 15 hr childcare guarantee from the age of 3, and the highest childcare costs in
Europe – a childcare participation tax rate of 102%. The maternity leave replacement rate is only 31% of an average wage,
the lowest in the sample, withmothers and fathers having to organize paidwork and care at their own expense.
7 | HOW MUCH WELFARE STATES DEGENDERIZE
To fully support inclusive citizenship, welfare states also need to be generous. To understand generosity, in this sec-
tion, we examine how much welfare states policies degender. We also examine whether patterns in approach (how
F IGURE 6 Type VI: Financially supportive policy package: Austria, Netherlands, Spain, Poland and Greece
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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welfare states degenderize) is related to generosity. Figure 9 summarizes the overall SMOP proportions for state
support for degenderization as a proportion of the best possible score of 2.598 (see Appendix A for the country
rankings of unstandardized scores). Only one country, Norway (58.1%) is over half way toward the benchmark of
degendering policy. Sweden (46.5%), Estonia (42.9%) and Germany (39.1%) follow. Countries that are the least
degendering are Czech Republic (4.0%), Slovak Republic, (2.3%), the United Kingdom (2.3%) and Ireland (0.9%). (The
sensitivity analysis produces a similar country ranking, with only Hungary and Iceland swapping places and France
moving below Greece – See Appendix B: Figure B1).
Figure 10 compares the SMOP proportion for degendering in the public sphere (maternal employment) com-
pared to the private sphere (care). It is evident that nearly all welfare states more generously challenge gender role
norms in the public sphere than the private, with Estonia (type III), Norway, Sweden and Germany (type 1) reaching
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(financially supportive, type V1) (and the UK at a very low level) are more equally degendering in the public and pri-
vate sphere, albeit with different emphasis placed on differing aspects of public and private spheres leading to these
countries having differing approaches to degenderization. Iceland is the only country more degendering in care than










F IGURE 9 Generosity: Surface measure of overall performance proportion for Degendering Index [Colour figure
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F IGURE 10 Generosity: Surface measure of overall performance proportion for Degendering public and private
sphere [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Generally speaking, degendering approach (type) is related to generosity (SMOP score) of a welfare state: the
type of degendering welfare state is significantly correlated with the SMOP generosity score (−0.857 p = .000). The
balanced policy approach of type 1 seems to be the most common route to a highly degendering welfare state, with
SMOP proportions that are 1st (Norway), 2nd (Sweden) and 4th (Germany) in the degendering league table. They
still, however, fall short of being fully degendering since women are assumed to be the main carers to very young
children. Germany is the least generous of the group, reflecting its emergence from a transitional phase from a con-
servative country previously discouraging female labour, previously ranking 7th, 8th or 9th in defamilizing indexes
(Lohmann & Zegal, 2016) and being classed as explicitly gendering by Saxonberg (2013) who did, however, correctly
predict (p. 19) that “Germany might eventually join the group of degenderized countries”.
At the other end, the policy approach of type VII and VIIa has virtually no support for degenderization: all wel-
fare states in these types are amongst the least generous in the sample, falling at the bottom of the degendering
league table.
But a similar approach does not always indicate similar levels of generosity. A notable example of this is type
III: Estonia is the third most generous in the sample, but Hungary is ranked 13th. That Estonia is so generous may
be an argument for placing it in type 1 in line with the cluster analysis. But, in contrast to type 1, both Hungary
and Estonia are more generous in degenderizing paid work than they are care (see Figure 10). Despite Estonia's
generosity in supporting maternal paid work, such an unbalanced approached will fall short of supporting inclu-
sive citizenship. Basically, Hungary is a less generous version of Estonia, but more generous than other post-
communist states. So, despite varying levels of generosity, their approach is similar, which warrants them being
placed in the same type.
8 | ARE MORE SUPPORTIVE WELFARE STATES MORE DEGENDERING?
There is little systematic evidence about the impact of different packages and typologies of childcare/parental leave
regimes on gender equality outcomes (Lauri, Põder, & Ciccia, 2020). Studies that examine the relationship between
defamilization and gender equality outcomes report mixed results (e.g., Lauri et al., 2020; Chau et al., 2017). Lauri
et al. (2020) conclude this is because similar policy configurations produce different outcomes in different cultural
contexts. But it might be because the policy indexes and/or the outcomes examined do not (fully) measure gender
equality per se. This section seeks to understand whether measuring policies from the standpoint of degenderization
indicate a link with gender equality outcomes – whether welfare states with more generous/different types of
degendering welfare packages also experience more positive gender equality outcomes. Simple correlations were
undertaken with key indicators, chosen to reflect degenderization. Whilst this provides an indicator of how policies
translate into outcomes, it is by no means conclusive. More complex analysis needs to be undertaken to understand
the link between the two, but space constrains further discussion here.
Key outcomes that are significantly related to both generosity and type of degendering state were gender gaps:
in employment (−0.611** and 0.658**) and in full-time equivalent rates (the proportion of the population that would
be employed if all those in employment worked a full-time 40-hr working week) (−0.630** and 0.683**). The gender
gap in unpaid (0.644*) and care (0.739**) work was related to type of degendering state but not generosity, although
data were only available for 12 countries (this however included a representative of each degendering type). The
female employment rate is not significantly correlated with generosity or degendering type (although this is partly
due to the outliers Iceland and Greece), but the maternal employment rate (no data for Iceland or Norway) is (0.517*,
−0573**). This is attributed to the correlation of maternal employment with generosity of private sphere polices
(0.628**) but not public, which are actually more overtly aimed at maternal employment (n.s). This may explain why
Germany's maternity employment rate (although not female) is lower than Sweden (both type 1), given its less gener-
ous private policies, although it may also be due to a policy lag, with Germany's degendering family policies being
introduced relatively recently in 2009 and 2015.
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There is not a significant relationship between the employment rate for mothers with children aged 0–2
(no data for Norway, Sweden and Iceland by age) for generosity or type, with the Eastern European countries (Czech
republic, Estonia, Slovakia Republic and Hungary) – having noticeably lower employment rates for mothers with chil-
dren under 2 than might be expected, given their generosity and degendering type. However, generosity (0.555*)
and type of degendering state (−0.641**) are significantly related to employment for mothers with a child aged 3–5
− significantly related to public (0.555*) as well as private (0.542*) policies, although with Greece and Spain as out-
liers – lower maternal employment than expected. Estonia also has the highest employment rate for mothers with
children aged 3–5 of the sample for which data are available, reflecting its generosity for degendering paid work.
Whilst this sets it apart from its type III cousin Hungary and may again be an argument for placing it in type 1, both
have very low maternal employment rates with children aged 0–2, likely explained by similar approaches to
degendering care. More sophisticated analysis needs to be undertaken, but there appears to be some evidence that
degendering policies do matter for gender equality outcomes.
9 | CONCLUSION
This paper has compiled an index to compare how much (generosity) and how (type) 22 European welfare states
degenderize and thus how far they support inclusive citizenship – the right to care, work and earn (Kremer, 2007).
Supporting inclusive citizenship requires welfare states to challenge gender role norms in both paid work and care to
enable both men and women to break from gendered assumptions and enjoy full citizenship. Thus, to better under-
stand welfare state progress in supporting inclusive citizenship, this paper adopted the concept of degenderization,
rather than defamilization, as a more suitable analytical tool to compare cross-nationally.
The paper has built upon studies that have applied benchmarking and graphical analyses to comparative family policy
(e.g., J. Javornik, 2014; K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017; Kurowska & Javornik, 2019) by widening the countries analysed, and
adopting the surface measure of overall performance (SMOP) method to compare how much welfare states degenderize
(generosity), as well as utilizing radar charts to examine how they do so (approach). We have therefore been able to exam-
ine policies in more detail and identify policy patterns that have not been identified previously with different methods. This
includes variation among countries that are often treated as representatives of one of the “worlds of welfare”
(K. Javornik & Kurowska, 2017). It has enabled us to identify welfare states that encourage full inclusive citizenship by visu-
ally examining how countries degenderize in both public and private policy, and by using SMOP to understand which are
also being generous – how close to the ideal they are – in their approach. Together, the concept of degenderization and
chosen methods has enabled a more nuanced analysis of childcare and parental leave that identifies degendering policy
types that are more or less supportive of inclusive citizenship.
The visual analysis identified seven types. Type 1's approach more closely supports inclusive citizenship com-
pared to other types because these welfare states take a relatively balanced approach to degenderizing paid work in
all the policy areas, not focusing on one over the other, with efforts to degenderize both work and care. But all
22 welfare states failed to reach the benchmark of inclusive citizenship (including type 1) because of the failure to
degenderize care. This shows that more policy attention has been paid to women's right to paid work than men's
right to care, even in Nordic countries. This reflects findings in other recent research. For example, Ciccia and
Verloo (2012), Ciccia and Bleijenbergh (2014) and (Ciccia (2017) compared 30 countries to understand how they can
be related to Fraser's (1994) theoretical family models of the division of labour, and found none were reaching the
utopia of supporting the ideal “universal caregiver” model, with the majority of countries still adhering to universal
breadwinner models. Whilst some welfare states have extended father's time rights, they have either not supported
father's to take these up (especially in type IV, V and VII) and/or still support women to enjoy more generous mater-
nity or transferable leaves rights (especially types III, VI and VII), meaning that they are unlikely to successfully chal-
lenge gender role norms in the private sphere. Indeed, this paper has shown that welfare states with a more
generous and balanced degendering policy approach in both the public (paid work) and private (care) sphere will be
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most supportive of inclusive citizenship: they more likely to have lower intra-household gender gaps in unpaid work
and care and in turn higher maternal employment, especially, for older pre-school children.
The paper has shown that a visualization method can enlighten our understandings of the nuanced differences
between states that are often grouped together, and similarities between states not traditionally grouped together.
It has highlighted inconsistencies between parental leave and childcare policy packages but also individual policy
indicators. It builds upon K. Javornik and Kurowska (2017) who used a similar visualization method to examine the
Nordic and Baltic states, who also found that the Nordic countries do not make up a single type of welfare state
when analysed in relation to support for gender equality. This appears in part because many of the Nordic countries
have parental leave and childcare policies with contradictions in terms of how they degender (Ciccia, 2017). Thus,
the paper has shown the need for a more nuanced understanding of how welfare types breakdown gender roles. It
has indicated that the extent that welfare states degenderize in the public and private sphere explains intra-
household gender gaps and maternal employment and that without a balanced policy approach welfare states are




1 Except the Netherlands – the source was OECD and date 2014.
2 NB: If the number of hours offered changes according to age then the score for each age group would be calculated
accordingly, added together and then averaged.
3 The CPTR is based on the assumptions inherent to the OECD Tax/Benefit models when calculating the tax/benefit posi-
tion of persons (OECD, 2016).
4 In some countries it is possible to reallocate the days to the other parents in special circumstances.
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F IGURE A1 (a) Participation rate 100 + 67% of average earnings including childcare costs (2015). (b) Childcare
Guarantee (Hours guaranteed * Age guaranteed from) (2012/13). (c) Maternity leave wage replacement rate (2016).
(d) Flexible paternity leave (2016). (e) Paternity leave payment rate (%) (2016). (f) Gender leave gap (%) (2016) (Leave
open to mother (weeks)*average replacement rate/leave reserved for father (weeks)*average replacement rate rate/





F IGURE B1 Degendering score: Additive index [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE B1 Cluster analysis
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7
Norway Finland Hungary Iceland France Ireland Slovak Republic





Note: Bold terms represents some evidence that these form a type cluster of its own.
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